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Abstract
In this short paper, we review the criticism of the standard view (the old view) of
foreign prot taxation which goes back to Peggy Musgrave (née Richman, 1963).
This new viewof international taxation is based on recent empirical studies and
favours a system where foreign prots are exempt from tax. We critically discuss
the debate between old view and new view proponents and, nally, confront the
two with a pragmatic viewon foreign prot taxation which crucially builds on
compliance and tax administration cost.
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1 Introduction
Forty-seven years ago, Peggy Brewer Musgrave founded the modern theory of in-
ternational taxation (under her maiden name Richman, 1963). There are few the-
ories in public nance which have been as inuential with regard to real world tax
policy. Musgraves book (Richman, 1963) and her article, Musgrave (1969), and
the following contributions like Hamada (1966) and Feldstein & Hartman (1979)
provided an intellectual foundation for international taxation agreements like e.g.
the OECD convention on double taxation treaties.1 According to Musgraves the-
ory, each country has the incentive to tax foreign prots of its multinational rms
even if these prots have already been taxed abroad. Since double taxation is
ine¢ cient from a global point of view, countries should agree to adopt a system of
international taxation in which foreign tax payments are credited against domestic
taxes. Accordingly, the OECD Tax Treaties let countries choose between the tax
credit system and exempting foreign income from tax. In other words, countries
choose between equal treatment for domestic and foreign prots and a benecial
tax treatment of foreign income (i.e. the exemption system).
In recent years, there is an increasing awareness that, due to changes in the
economic environment, the existing rules for taxing foreign prots might be in
need of reform. However, the direction of reform is controversial. Some authors
including Desai & Hines (2003, 2004) challenge Musgraves tax policy recommend-
ations. Based on new theoretical arguments and empirical ndings, it is argued
that the tax credit system is ine¢ cient from a national point of view. Instead, ex-
emption is seen to be the best option. This criticism as well as Musgraves policy
recommendations are e¢ ciency-oriented and concern the nationally or globally op-
timal allocation of capital across locations. They do not question the legitimacy
of corporate taxation in general (see Devereux, 2010, for a broader discussion of
this issue), nor will we in what follows.2
1For earlier justications, see Graetz & OHear (1997).
2Recent contributions like Schön (2009, 2010) and Devereux (2010) choose a broader approach
and ask for the justication of corporate taxation in general. Corporate taxes may act as a back-
stop to the personal income tax which requires the tax credit system. However, as rm ownership
is increasingly internationally diversied, this rationale for taxing foreign source income is losing
plausibility. Moreover, the corporate income tax can be seen as a tax on domestic economic
activity, which is justied as rms benet from public services. This approach suggests that
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In 2008, the United Kingdom followed the arguments brought forward by pro-
ponents of the exemption system and abolished the tax credit system for foreign
source dividends of its domestic multinational rms.3 In the United States, the
tax credit system is still in force but, in 2004, a tax holiday was granted for the
repatriation of foreign prots of U.S. multinational rms. In contrast, during the
2008 presidential campaign, even deferral of domestic taxes on foreign prots was
criticized as a subsidy for sending U.S. jobs o¤shore(Lynch, 2008). In Germany,
where foreign source dividends are (mostly) exempt from domestic taxation, some
economists propose the introduction of the tax credit system, as exemption is
thought to lead to ine¢ ciently high investment levels abroad (Homburg, 2005).
In the following, we discuss and compare the old Musgrave view on foreign
income taxation and the new view favoring exemption. Afterwards we confront
these two arguments with a third, more pragmatic view which - interestingly - is
mainly brought forward by scholars from the business administration branch and
tax practitioners.
2 The old view
Considering Musgraves theory, it is helpful to recall that, at this time in the 1960s,
the United States were the worlds largest capital exporter. Musgrave assumed that
a representative multinational rm invests a xed capital stock either in domestic
projects or abroad. The rm maximizes its prots and, consequently, invests so as
to equalize the after-tax returns in both locations. However, such an investment
behaviour is not in the national interest, as taxes paid to the domestic government
are, from a social point of view, income and not cost. Thus, nationally optimal
investment equalizes the pre-tax return at home with the after-tax return abroad.
As Musgrave demonstrated, such investment behaviour requires a system with full
domestic taxation of foreign income after deducting foreign tax payments. If global
welfare is the policy goal, the picture changes again. Globally optimal investment
corporate income earned abroad should not be taxed domestically, so that the exemption system
seems appropriate.
3To be precise, the exemption system has been introduced for income repatriated from foreign
subsidiaries (in contrast to foreign permanent establishments).
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equalizes the pre-tax returns in both locations. This is in line with actual rm
investment behaviour if the e¤ective tax rates are equal, which can be achieved by
a tax credit system.
For purpose of clarity, consider the following simple model. Let k and k denote
the stocks of capital at home and abroad, respectively, and f (k) and f  (k) the
output of production. Capital is rented at an interest rate of r from domestic
savers who provide xed savings of K. Then, after-tax prots  are given by
 = f (k) (1  ) + f  (k) (1       r)  r (k + k) (1)
where  and   denote source-based corporate taxes at home and abroad, respect-
ively, and  r the repatriation tax levied by the home country. Prot maximization
implies that the multinational rm sets f 0 = r= (1  ) and f 0 = r= (1       r).
The interest rate adjusts until k + k = K.
Is such investment behavior e¢ cient? Musgrave argued that the multinational
rm does not account for the fact that taxes paid at home are part of national
income, rather than costs. The same is true for interest paid to domestic savers.
Seen from the national point of view, income is given by WN = + r K + f (k) +
 rf  (k). Musgrave then asks which kind of repatriation tax maximizes national
income:
max
r
WN = f (k) + f  (k) (1   ) subject to k + k  K (2)
Accounting for the multinationals investment behaviour, national optimality
is reached if f 0 = f 0 (1   ). Choosing an adequate tax rate aligns the rms
with national incentives. The rm then invests as to maximize national welfare:
f 0 = f 0
1       r
1   = f
0 (1   ) if  r =  (1   ) (3)
Thus, if foreign prots are fully taxed after deducting foreign tax payments,
the rms investment implicitly satises national optimality.
Of course nationally optimal tax policy does not take into account that foreign
taxes are income, too. Therefore, national optimality does not equal global op-
timality. Seen from the global point of view, income is given by WG =  + r K +
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f (k) + (  +  r) f  (k). The optimal repatriation tax problem then reads
max
r
WG = f (k) + f  (k) subject to k + k  K (4)
which implies optimal investment according to f 0 = f 0. Again, it is feasible to
align the rms interests with global optimality objectives by choosing the adequate
repatriation tax rate:
f 0 = f 0
1       r
1   = f
0 if  r =      (5)
Since its publication, Musgraves theory has been extended and criticized many
times. Important extensions concern the assumption of endogenous savings (Horst,
1980, Keen & Piekkola, 1997), the implementation of double taxation agreements
in a strategic multi-country setting (e.g., Janeba, 1995, Mintz & Tulkens, 1996,
and Davies, 2004), taking into account shareholder and rm level taxation (Fuest
and Huber, 2004) and the focus on mergers and acquisitions, see Desai & Hines
(2003, 2004) and Becker & Fuest (2010). Various attempts of criticism before the
new view have failed (Grubert & Mutti, 1995).
3 The new view
In Musgraves model, the supply of capital available for investment in the domestic
and foreign location is limited. As a consequence, more foreign investment crowds
out domestic investment. The new view starts from the observation that this
model feature is at odds with capital markets of today. After capital controls have
been removed in most countries, it seems adequate to assume a large world capital
market instead of limited capital supply by domestic savers. With a large world
market for capital, the interest rate is no longer determined by domestic supply
and the multinationals demand. Instead, the interest rate is taken as given from
the national point of view and there is (virtually) innite supply of capital at this
rate. In such a setting, an increase in foreign investment leaves the interest rate
and, thus, domestic investment una¤ected. A tax on repatriated prots no longer
increases domestic investment, it justs reduces foreign investment by domestic
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rms. If national income maximization is the policy goal, a tax on foreign prots
e¤ectively reduces income and should therefore be abandoned. In other words, tax
exemption is the best policy option from a national point of view.
In the context of the model described above, the multinational has the same
prot function as in (1). Again, the rm sets f 0 = r= (1  ) and f 0 = r= (1       r).
However, its investment does not lead to any (or only negligible) interest rate ad-
justments. The optimization problem from the national point of view is now given
by
max
r
WN = f (k) + f  (k) (1   )  r (k + k) + r K (6)
where the multinationals capital stock, k+ k, may well be smaller or larger than
the domestic supply of savings, K. Nationally optimal investment abroad implies
f 0 = r= (1   ) and, thus, the optimality of the exempting foreign prots from
tax,  r = 0. The reason is that a tax-induced reduction of foreign investment does
not lead to an increase in domestic investment (as in the old view model), the tax
rather implies that the investor abandons some projects. As a consequence, the
whole national economy foregoes some income.
With regard to global optimality, exemption proponents do not deny that the
tax credit system maximizes global income. Of course, if policy changes are eval-
uated on a global scale (and not from the viewpoint of a small country) there is
no such thing as a given interest rate. In terms of the above described model,
the issue of global optimality simply cannot be investigated in this setup because
the model is not closed: the supply of capital to the world capital market is not
modeled explicitly.
There are, however, some drawbacks to the claim that tax exemption of for-
eign prots is nationally optimal. In the old view model both domestic and foreign
investment reach e¢ cient levels if the adequate tax system is applied. In the new
view model, nationally optimal investment at home would imply f 0 = r, but rms
only invest until f 0 = r= (1  ). Therefore, one might argue that, given the gov-
ernments spending needs, it may be worthwhile to slightly cut domestic corporate
tax rates and increase the tax on foreign investment. Indeed, as Devereux (2004)
shows, the optimal tax rates on domestic and foreign capital depend on the elasti-
city of capital demand in both locations. Furthermore, introducing diseconomies
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of scale which e¤ectively limit the size of the multinational rm implies that the
old Musgrave result is restored. Finally, the fact that the marginal investment unit
needs to remain untaxed (at least from the national point of view) does not re-
quire exemption of all foreign prots. A cross-border cash ow system (see Becker
& Fuest, 2010) may generate tax revenue without distorting foreign investment
decisions (the same may apply for domestic investment, of course, which raises the
question why cash-ow taxes are not used more in real world tax systems).4
4 Old view versus new view - whats the score?
Clearly there are limitations to both the old and the new view. However, countries
have to decide which system of international taxation to adopt and, thus, which
view to favour. One might argue that the debate boils down to a single empirically
testable question: What happens to domestic investment if foreign investment is
increased? The old views answer is: Domestic investment decreases, therefore
foreign investment should be taxed. The new views answer is: Nothing happens,
therefore foreign investment should not be taxed.
Whether domestic and foreign investment are substitutes, not linked at all
or even complements, has been in the focus of many recent empirical studies.5
Using data of multinational rms, these studies almost unanimously nd that an
increase of foreign activity does not lead to a reduction of domestic activity of this
rm. As some new view advocates6 have argued, this may prove the case of the
new view. However, a look at aggregate data as in Feldstein (1995) shows that,
across all rms, foreign investment crowds out domestic investment dollar for
dollar(Feldstein, 1995). This nding is conrmed by proponents of exemption,
see Desai, Foley & Hines (2005).
Moreover, exemption is no adequate option for a world which tries to coordinate
on e¢ ciency-enhancing tax systems. Exemption proponents stress the national
interest but do not deny that the tax credit system might be more suitable in
4Becker and Fuest (2010) also show that, in a world with international M&A investment,
global optimality is achieved neither by the tax credit system nor by the exemption system.
5See e.g. Egger & Pfa¤ermayr (2003), Simpson (2008), Desai, Foley & Hines (2009) and
Kleinert & Toubal (forthcoming).
6See e.g. Desai & Hines (2003, 2004), Hines (2009), Desai (2009).
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promoting global e¢ ciency. Thus, one may translate the new view into something
like the following approach: Given that we cannot coordinate on all countries
implementing the tax credit system, tax policy should focus on national optimality
and abolish the tax credit system.
The new view argument based on the assumption of a perfectly elastic capital
supply is perhaps the most important one in favor of tax exemption but the debate
does not stop there. In tax credit countries like the US and until 2008 the
UK, a number of somewhat di¤erent arguments were brought forward which can
be summarised as follows. Firstly, a tax on foreign prots creates incentives to
move headquarters to other countries. There have been some widely discussed
examples in the U.K., and headquarter mobility in the form of corporate inversions,
where U.S. parent companies of foreign subsidiaries transformed into subsidiaries
of foreign rms, is an important policy issue in the U.S. (see e.g. United States
Department of the Treasury, 2002). Empirical studies like Voget (forthcoming)
trying to systematically capture the extent of headquarter mobility show that it
is observable but only to a limited extent.
Secondly, a tax on repatriated prots increases the cost of capital and therefore
deteriorates the competitiveness of domestic rms. As many countries already
employ the exemption system, rms from tax credit countries have a competitive
disadvantage. Therefore, countries should switch to the exemption system. This
argument is very similar to the strategic trade arguments made in the 1980s (see
e.g. Brander & Spencer, 1985) and is therefore subject to the same sort of criticism.
The argument can, however, be restated in the framework discussed above: A tax
on repatriated prots leads to a reduction in foreign activity without increasing
domestic activity. Under imperfect competition, the situation gets even worse, as
the oligopoly rents are reduced. From this perspective, it becomes clear that the
exemption proponents implicitly assume that negative tax rates are ruled out. If
they are allowed for, a case for subsidies for foreign activity can be made. Moreover,
if transfer prices for intra-rm trade are taken into account the case for exemption
becomes less obvious (Becker, 2010).
A third important argument builds on the di¤erence between greeneld invest-
ment and mergers and acquisitions (M&A; i.e. mere changes in ownership). Desai
& Hines (2003, 2004) argue that ownership changes do not a¤ect the allocation
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of real capital in the rst place but may have real e¢ ciency e¤ects. Repatri-
ation taxes, however, distort the allocation of ownership across countries (see also
Devereux, 2008).7 As we show in Becker & Fuest (2010), this consideration is
correct, but incomplete. An e¢ cient ownership allocation does not require zero
taxation of all repatriated prots. A cross-border cash-ow tax system may gener-
ate tax revenues without distorting the decision to merge with or to acquire foreign
rms (see also Ruf, 2009).8
Fourthly and nally, there is the argument that deferral of prot repatriation
and other avoidance techniques imply large e¢ ciency costs under the tax credit
system. As many empirical studies have shown, deferral (Dharmapala, Foley &
Forbes, 2009) and tax avoidance activities (Huizinga & Laeven, 2008) play an
important role. It is, however, less clear whether tax avoidance incentives are
stronger under the tax credit system or under the exemption system. Whereas the
incentive to defer prot repatriations is higher under the tax credit system, the
e¤ective tax di¤erentials and, thus, the incentive to shift prots across locations
is higher under the exemption system. It is an open question which of these two
margins implies the larger e¢ ciency cost.
In total, the old view seems to be more robust than initially expected by the
new view advocates. So, it might be surprising that international tax policy seems
to be decidedly inclined towards the new view. As mentioned in the introduction,
the United Kingdom recently abandoned the tax credit system and adopted an
exemption system (accompanied, though, by a range of tax law provisions des-
ignated to avoid prot shifting activities of multinational rms). Currently, the
United States are the last large country holding on to the tax credit system. And,
despite the concern about excessive investment abroad mentioned in the introduc-
tion, there are strong political forces favouring a switch to exemption.
Given the state of the debate, the question arises why there is such a strong
movement towards exemption. It may be the case that there is another argument,
7For a simple example see Fuest (2010). The e¢ ciency implications of residence based taxes
in a world with M&A investment are explored systematically in Becker and Fuest (forthcoming).
8Moreover, there has been the presumption that exemption is the best policy response in the
presence of heterogeneous multinational rms that seek market access in foreign markets, see
Desai (2009). However, it can be formally shown that the Richman results prove to be robust
even in such a setting, see Becker (2009).
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a third view in favour of exemption that is persuasive enough to make people
accept the potential investment distortions implied by the exemption system. We
call this view the pragmatic view.
5 The pragmatic view
The debate between the old view and the new view focuses on the e¢ ciency of
the capital allocation and is led mainly by economists. In recent years, some tax
policy practitioners and tax lawyers have brought forward the simple but compel-
ling argument that a tax credit system might be just too expensive to implement.
Whereas a tax exemption system only builds on the di¤erence between foreign
and domestic prots, a tax credit system needs to allocate prots to each location
within a multinational rm. The complexity of rm structures that are typical
for modern multinationals make it hard and expensive to trace income through all
layers of the rm both for the reporting rm and the auditing authority. Complex
ownership arrangements add to these di¢ culties. For instance, a discussion docu-
ment by the HM Treasury and HM Revenue and Customs (2007) states that the
exemption system is supposed to provide important benets in terms of reduced
compliance costs (particularly in relation to foreign dividends).(p. 34). Simil-
arly, a policy paper issued by the International Chamber of Commerce (2003),
which compares the tax credit system and the exemption system, concludes: "On
balance, ... the ICC favours an exemption system on foreign dividends primarily
because...the costs of compliance for foreign dividends are considerably reduced as
compared to a tax credit system."9
Compliance and administration cost of corporate taxation are signicant. The
European Commission (2004) estimates that large rms on average bear a com-
pliance cost of more than 1:4 million Euros or 1:9 per cent of their total tax
payments which is in line with the results found by Slemrod & Blumenthal (1996)
for large U.S. rms. For small rms, average compliance costs are estimated to
equal 200:000 Euros or 30:9 per cent of their tax payments.10 Most importantly for
9In the context of the debate on reforming rules for the taxation of foreign source income in
Germany, aspects of compliance and administration costs are also emphasized by Lüdicke (2008).
10Large rms are those with more than 250 employees, small rms with less employees.
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the purpose of this paper, the European Commission (2004) nds that compliance
costs increase by more than 400 per cent when the rm is active in more than one
jurisdiction.11 There is less evidence for tax administration cost. Some studies
suggest that administration costs are somewhat lower than compliance cost, see
Slemrod & Blumenthal (1996) and Evans (2003), but especially estimates of dif-
ferences in these cost between auditing a purely national rm and a multinational
rm are not available. A comparison between compliance cost under tax credits
and under exemption is missing as well.12
The pragmatic argument that the tax credit system is just too costly to im-
plement is potentially a strong one. Its simplicity and bluntness have probably
prevented public nance theorists from dealing with it more closely, but this does
not reduce its relevance. There is, however, a severe lack of thorough empirical
studies which clarify the relative cost of compliance and tax administration of the
tax credit system and the exemption system. From the old view perspective, the
cost di¤erence would have to be substantial in order to justify a switch to the
exemption system.
6 Conclusions
For decades, the theory and practice of international taxation have been strongly
inuenced by what we have called the old viewof foreign prot taxation. Accord-
ing to this view, the application of the tax credit system is globally optimal while
nationally optimal tax policy would imply a double taxation of border crossing
capital income ows. Recently, however, this view has been challenged both in
the academic debate and in real world tax policy, where the exemption system has
gained support. In a world where capital markets are more and more integrated
11It should be noted, though, that the European Commission may be biased on this issue as it
promotes the proposal for a common consolidated corporate tax base of which the main objective
is to reduce compliance cost.
12Evans (2003) summarizes a survey on studies measuring compliance and tax administration
cost as follows: Compliance costs are highly signicant for the main central government taxes
(...). They are high however measured - whether in absolute money terms or relative to tax yield,
GDP or administrative costs. For example, the studies suggest that compliance costs of such
taxes are typlically anywhere between 2% and 10% of the revenue yield from those taxes; up to
2.5% of GDP; and usually a multiple (of between two and six) of administrative costs.
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and multinational rms nd it easier to shift their headquarters across countries,
the case for the tax credit system is called into question. The new viewseems
to suggest that exemption is at least nationally optimal. Nevertheless, while the
new view has introduced new and relevant aspects into the debate, it is not clear
whether these arguments are su¢ cient to establish the superiority of exemption
so convincingly that abolishing the domestic taxation of foreign source dividends
is justied. We therefore point to a third, more pragmatic approach to the taxa-
tion of foreign source income. While both the old and the new view focus on the
implications of taxation for the international allocation of capital, the pragmatic
viewemphasises compliance and administration costs of taxing foreign source in-
come. According to this view, these costs are rising as multinational rms become
larger and increasingly complex. Given that there are many ways of avoiding taxes
on repatriated prots, this view suggests that the balance between the benet of
raising tax revenue from foreign investment and the cost, in particular the com-
pliance and administration cost, has changed and made the taxation of foreign
source income unattractive. Clearly, more empirical research on compliance and
administration costs related to the taxation of border crossing economic activity
is needed to investigate whether this is true.
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